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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEES "STATEMENT OF FACTS" REFERENCES PORTIONS OF THE 
RECORD WHICH WERE NOT ADMISSIBLE AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
The first issue on appeal is whether there is sufficient 
evidence in the record to sustain conviction. Complicating the 
issues which are before the court is the fact that defendant was 
tried with a co-defendant who was convicted of homicide. 
Although defendant was convicted of only one felony and two 
misdemeanors, the trial lasted two and one half weeks, and the 
record is substantial. The size of the record, and the fact that 
the bulk of the evidence was directed toward the co-defendant 
complicates the chore of examining whether there was sufficient 
evidence to convict the defendant. 
The evidence is also difficult to examine because the trial 
court instructed the jury not to consider the testimony of 
several of the witnesses against the defendant Travis Widdison. 
(R.1628 p. 21 line 24 through page 22 line 7, R. 1631 p. 134 line 
17 to p. 135 line 5). Despite the trial court's instructions 
preventing the jury from considering the testimony of certain 
witnesses against Travis Widdison, the State has referenced the 
proscribed testimony of Jamie Widdison as establishing some of 
the facts in this matter. (Brief of Appellee, P.7, R. 1631:100-
02) . Curiously, in its statement of facts (Which are supposed to 
have been set forth in a light most favorable to the jury 
verdict, Brief of appellee p. 5 footnote 2), the State has also 
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made several references to R. 1618 which is part of the 
preliminary hearing transcript, and which was not in evidence at 
trial. (Brief of Appellee pp. 11, 12, 13). As they were not in 
evidence at trial, defendant requests that the court not consider 
these references in considering the facts. 
II. THE RECORD LACKS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION. 
In its brief the State admits that the evidence established 
that Bobbie Dawn, and not the defendant actually inflicted the 
injuries on the decedent. (Brief of Appellant P. 25). As 
indicated in previous memoranda defendant's sufficiency challenge 
is based on the fourth element of child abuse found in jury 
instruction 13. (R. At 1612). "4. Having the care or custody of 
B.L., intentionally or knowingly permitted another to inflict a 
serious injury upon B.L. a child under the age of 18." The 
issues can be further focused to whether defendant had care or 
custody of B.L., and whether he "knowingly or intentionally" 
permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict the injuries. 
A. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT HAVE "CARE OR CUSTODY" OF B.L. 
The first consideration on a sufficiency claim is statutory 
interpretation. State v. Fisher, 972 P.2d 90, 97 (Utah App. 
1998). The statutory interpretation consideration includes 
making a determination of the intent of the Legislature. State 
v. Jones, 735 P.2d 399, 402 (Utah App. 1987). In the case at 
bar, the terms requiring interpretation are "care or custody". 
In his previous memorandum, appellant urged the court to apply 
the definition of custody used in UCA 78-3a-103(1)(o)(Supp. 
2 
1998) . The State has responded by claiming that the argument is 
being raised for the first time on appeal. (Brief of Appellee at 
P. 27). This argument was not made to raise a new issue on 
appeal, but was intended to assist the court in giving effect to 
the intent of the Legislature. Section 78-3a-103(1)(o)(Supp. 
1998) is the only place in the Utah Code where the Legislature 
gives a definition of either of the terms in question. 
Rather than use a reference to a statute of the State of 
Utah to assist in defining "care or custody", the State urges 
adoption of a definition used by the Arizona Supreme Court in 
State v. Jones, 937 P.2d 310, 314 (Ariz. 1997). Application of 
the Arizona Statute would be sensible if the Arizona and Utah 
statutes embodied the same prohibitions on conduct. 
Unfortunately, the Arizona statute includes prohibition of 
placing a child "in a situation where its person or health is 
endangered." Id at 314. That is very different from knowingly or 
intentionally permitting another to inflict a serious injury on a 
child. 
Application of the Arizona and Webster's Dictionary 
definition to the terms care or custody does not change the fact 
that there is no evidence that Travis had "care or custody" at 
the time the injuries were inflicted on B.L. Many of the factors 
used by the Arizona court to determine that Mr. Jones had care or 
custody are not present in the case at bar. Jones was a case 
where a live-in boyfriend, who acted in every respect as a 
stepfather, abused and murdered a young child. The court in 
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Jones considered all of the factors in the relationship in 
considering "care or custody." Many of the factors considered in 
Jones are not present in the case at bar. There is no evidence 
that Travis provided food or shelter for B.L. There is no 
evidence that Travis considered himself a stepfather to Bobbie 
Dawn's children. There is no evidence that Travis accepted 
responsibility for B.L. by taking her out alone. There is no 
evidence that Travis dominated Bobbie Dawn, or controlled her 
income. There is no evidence that Travis assumed responsibility 
for B.L. by providing for her, or by assuming the role as her 
primary caretaker. In Jones, the defendant was present when the 
charged injuries were inflicted because the defendant inflicted 
the injuries. The above are all factors considered by the Jones 
case which are not present in the case at bar. 
The State argues that Defendant should be found to have care 
or custody based on Leet v. State, 595 So. 2d 959 (Fla.App. 2 
Dist. 1991). While there are some similarities between the role 
Mr. Leet assumed with his girlfriend's child, and the role Travis 
assumed with B.L., the Leet decision has no application in the 
case at bar. Florida Code Section 827.04(1) provides for 
conviction based on "culpable negligence." (Leet at 962). Mr. 
Leet's conviction was based on a "culpable negligence" standard, 
and the definition of "care or custody" in Leet was broad so as 
to include negligent conduct. Where the standard is negligence, 
a broad range of conduct can be considered by the jury. In 
footnote 3 of Leet, the court noted that the State did not prove 
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Mr. Leet had any legal malice or traditional criminal intent. In 
Leet it was not necessary to prove actual personal knowledge that 
his omission would lead to death or great bodily harm, as the 
statute as applied was based on criminal negligence. (Leet at 941 
footnote 3) 
Defendant has consistently admitted that at times he has had 
care or custody of B.L. (Brief of appellant at 15). Defendant's 
objection is to the State's position that Travis was in a 
permanent long term care or custody arrangement with B.L., and 
that he had care or custody at the time the injuries were 
inflicted. There is nothing about the definition of care or 
custody even using the definition proposed by the State that 
would make it a permanent rather than shifting arrangement given 
the facts present in the case at bar. Travis admits, and the 
record shows that there were times when he had care or custody of 
B.L. (R. 1600 at 216, Exhibit 3 9 at 19) The point that should be 
noted is that Travis assumed care or custody only when B.L. was 
not in Bobbie Dawn's custody, or when the child was not in her 
care. 
The State argues that the defendant has failed to marshal 
the evidence regarding care or custody because the marshaling was 
placed in an appendix, and was supposedly unfocused. (Brief of 
Appellant at 31). While marshaling evidence in an appendix may 
not be the preferred method of placing the evidence before the 
court, the evidence supporting the conviction has been made 
available. (The decisions criticizing this method of marshaling 
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are in civil rather than criminal cases. A.K. & R. Whipple 
Plumbing and Heating v. Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518, 525 
(Utah App. 1999)). The State also argues that the marshaled 
facts are unfocused and should not be considered. This argument 
is incorrect. In his previous memoranda, defendant pointed out 
that the sufficiency claim applied only to a single element of 
the crimes of which he was convicted. (Brief of Appellant at Il-
ls) . All of the marshaling is aimed toward a single element of 
the crimes charged. Further, every excerpt of the marshaled 
testimony in the appendix contains a heading regarding what the 
evidence demonstrates, and a statement regarding who is 
testifying. It is unfair to claim that the marshaling is 
unfocused. 
In reality, the marshaling which was done is unnecessary. 
As previously set forth, Travis admits that at times he has had 
care or custody of B.L. (Brief of appellant at 15). The 
evidence which is lacking is evidence that Travis had care or 
custody at the time Bobbie Dawn inflicted the injuries. There is 
no need to marshal evidence which is not in the record. Even if 
the court were to ignore the facts marshaled by defendant, the 
facts as set forth by the State on page 31 of the State's brief 
do not demonstrate care or custody at the time the injuries were 
inflicted. 
B. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO DEMONSTRATE KNOWING 
CONDUCT. 
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Examination of the record demonstrates that there is no 
evidence defendant was present when the injuries were inflicted 
on B.L. If the defendant was not present when the injuries were 
inflicted, it requires speculation to infer that he knowingly and 
intentionally permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict the injuries. The 
State again argues that this evidence was not properly marshaled. 
(Brief of appellee at 32) . What evidence exists on this point 
was set forth in the marshaled facts in the appendix, and is 
referred to and cited specifically in defendant's brief. (Brief 
of Appellant at 15, 16). In reality, marshaling is not necessary 
because there was no evidence Travis was present when the 
injuries were inflicted. 
The State marshaled evidence in its brief, and argues that 
the evidence set forth supports the conviction. Close 
examination of the State's argument demonstrates that the 
evidence set forth by the State in reality would support 
conviction of crimes which were not charged. The State prefaces 
the evidence with the following statement: "The following 
marshaled evidence supported a reasonable inference that 
defendant knew thai: Bobbie Dawn was abusing Breanna and that he 
did nothing to prevent the injuries he was charged with:". The 
problem with the State's position is that defendant was not 
charged with failing to prevent injuries, or with knowing that 
Bobbie Dawn had abused Breanna, and failing to report the abuse. 
Had Travis been charged with failure to report abuse under UCA 
62A-4a-411, the evidence would likely sustain conviction. The 
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evidence might also have supported a conviction for obstructing 
justice pursuant to 76-8-306 (1)(f). 
The evidence does not demonstrate that on the specific 
instances when the charged abuse was inflicted, Travis was 
present, or knew Bobbie Dawn was inflicting the abuse. U.C.A. 
76-1-501 indicates in pertinent part as follows: 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against 
him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such 
proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the 
definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
Despite the State's arguments to the contrary, being aware 
of the abuse and failing report it, does not satisfy the elements 
of UCA 76-5-109. The elements of child abuse as set forth in the 
jury instructions in this case the are as follows: 
That the defendant, TRAVIS D. WIDDISON; 
1. In Millard County, State of Utah; 
2. On or about February 10, 19 96; 
3. Intentionally or knowingly inflicted a serious physical 
injury; that is a fracture of the right clavicle, upon B.L., 
a child under the age of 18, or, 
4. Having the care or custody of B.L., intentionally or 
knowingly permitted another to inflict a serious injury upon 
B.L., a child under the age of 18. (R. at 1612). 
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To satisfy the requirements of 76-1-501 set forth above, as 
to the felony count, defendant would have to have known that 
Bobbie Dawn was either inflicting, or about to inflict a serious 
physical injury on B.L., and despite that knowledge, have 
permitted the abuse to take place. UCA 76-2-102 indicates that: 
"every offense not involving strict liability shall require 
a culpable mental state, and when the definition of the 
offense does not specify a culpable mental state and the 
offense does not involve strict liability, intent, 
knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility." 
UCA 76-6-109 requires that in the case at bar the State must have 
demonstrated knowing or intentional conduct. UCA 76-2-103 states 
that: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a 
result of his conduct, when it is his conscious 
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his 
conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect 
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the 
result. 
There are no facts in evidence demonstrating that the 
defendant acted either knowingly or intentionally with respect to 
the counts with which he is specifically charged. It is difficult 
to conclude that Travis acted knowingly or intentionally when it 
is impossible not to conclude that Bobbie Dawn would have abused 
her children regardless of whether Travis was residing in the 
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home. Bobbie Dawn is alleged to have engaged in abuse long 
before Travis was a resident of the home. (R.1601 at 66, R. 1631 
at 102, R. 1631 at 68, 69) . Without demonstrating that Travis 
was physically present when any of the charged acts of abuse 
occurred, there is no union of act and intent, and defendant's 
conviction cannot stand. 
III. BAD ACTS EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN ADMITTED AGAINST 
TRAVIS WIDDISON. 
The trial court in this matter made several rulings 
regarding the admissibility of prior bad acts evidence pursuant 
to Rules 401, 402, 403 and 404 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The trial court held that acts allegedly committed by Travis 
Widdison, which would usually be considered inadmissible 
character evidence, should be admitted into evidence for other 
purposes. (R. at 1383). The core of the trial court's ruling is 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). In its revised form Rule 404(b) is 
as follows: 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In 
other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible 
if it is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the 
requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
In the case at bar, the trial court admitted prior bad act 
evidence based upon the following finding: 
The Court finds that the proffered evidence is relevant and 
admissible under Rule 402 and Rule 404(b), as it is material 
to proof of issues such as identity, opportunity, knowledge, 
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and absence of accident. The proffered evidence is not 
offered solely to establish the bad character of the 
defendants. The Court finds that specific instances of 
conduct toward B.L. by the defendants is relevant to show 
not only a pattern of behavior, but absence of accident or 
mistake, opportunity, knowledge, or identity. The State may 
also offer evidence of abuse of J.W. and C.W., committed by 
the defendants, subject to the court's balancing the 
probative value of such evidence against its tendency to 
unfairly prejudice the defendants during the trial. (R. At 
1539, 1540). 
Admission of prior bad acts evidence is admissible if it is 
relevant for proper, non-character purposes. State v. Decorso, 
3 70 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 13 (Utah June 4, 1999) . The State argues 
that all of the prior bad act evidence admitted was admitted for 
the purposes set forth in the rule, and in the trial court's 
ruling.(Brief of Appellee at 36, 37). 
The difficulty with the States position is that the prior 
bad act evidence which was offered might have been admissible had 
the State attempted to prove that Defendant rather than Bobbie 
Dawn inflicted the injuries on B.L. The State admits on page 25 
of its brief that Bobbie Dawn inflicted the abuse on B.L. (Brief 
of Appellee at 25). This means that to be admissible, the 
challenged evidence must have been offered to show that Travis 
intentionally or knowingly permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict 
abuse. 
The State argues that the bad acts evidence was necessary to 
show absence of accident or mistake. (Brief of Appellee at 37) . 
The basis of this argument is that it was necessary for the State 
to demonstrate that B.L.'s injuries occurred intentionally rather 
than as a result of an accident or mistake. While this was 
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admittedly a proper use of prior bad act evidence against Bobbie 
Dawn, the prior bad act evidence admitted against Travis did 
little more than show bad character. 
Examination of the specific bad acts admitted against 
Travis Widdison demonstrates the difficulty with the State's 
arguments for admission. The evidence admitted against defendant 
consists of testimony by C.W. that Travis hit her in the nose, 
and struck her with a belt, (R. 1631 p. 47, 50, 62), and that he 
spanked B.L. (R. 1631 at 40, 41, 44). 
The State's main argument is that the bad act evidence helps 
eliminate arguments that B.L.'s injuries were the result of 
accident or mistake. The bad act evidence which was admitted 
against Travis Widdison does not help the State in establishing 
absence of accident or mistake. Where what the State is 
attempting to prove is that the defendant knowing or 
intentionally permitted Bobbie Dawn to inflict abuse on B.L., the 
fact that Travis may have injured C.W. or spanked B.L. does not 
help in proving that fact. Those facts merely inflame the jury 
against the defendant, and should not have been admitted. 
The challenged evidence is also inadmissible under Rules 401 
and 403 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 401 of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence describes relevant evidence as: 
"evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any 
fact that is of consequence to the determination of the 
action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence." (Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 401) . 
The bad act evidence which was admitted against Travis 
Widdison does not make it more or less probable that Travis 
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permitted Bobbie Dawn to injure B.L. The evidence is therefore 
inadmissible. 
The prior bad act evidence should also have been excluded 
under Rule 403, which states: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
The challenged evidence was extremely prejudicial against 
Travis Widdison. It: cast him in a role before the jury as a 
violent abusive person. This evidence was admitted despite the 
fact that the State's evidence showed that all of the physical 
acts of abuse were performed by the co-defendant. It is 
reasonable to infer chat the challenged evidence prejudiced 
defendant by leading the jury to convict based on the perception 
that he is a bad person, rather than based on the facts in 
evidence. The danger of the improperly admitted evidence is 
extreme because defendant's conviction is at best based on 
inferences. 
IV. THE STATE'S PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE VIOLATED PRINCIPLES OF 
ORDER OF PROOF. 
In response to the issues raised by defendant regarding 
order of proof, the State argues that the bad act evidence was 
necessarily offered in the case in chief for purposes of proving 
B.L. was not injured accidently. (Brief of Appellee at 25 
footnote 15) . The State argues that by pleading not guilty, 
defendants placed all of the elements of the crime at issue. 
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The State's position is difficult for two reasons. First, 
admission of bad act evidence violated the requirements of State 
v. Holder. 694 P. 2d 583 (Utah 1984) . Admission of the prior bad 
act evidence in the State's case in chief in effect forced 
defendant to take the witness stand, something he cannot be 
required to do. 
The second difficulty with the State's position is that the 
prior bad act evidence admitted against Travis did not 
demonstrate that B.L. was not injured accidently. There was no 
evidence that Travis inflicted the injuries on B.L. While 
evidence of Bobbie Dawn's prior bad acts helped the State 
establish that she injured B.L., none of the evidence went to 
whether Travis knowingly or intentionally permitted her to do so. 
V. C.W. SHOULD HAVE TESTIFIED IN OPEN COURT. 
J.W. and C.W., testified by closed circuit television. (R. 
at 1612). It is defendant's position that the trial court's 
finding that C.W. should testify by closed circuit was not 
supported by the evidence. The State argues that the trial 
court's finding that C.W. would "suffer serious emotional 
strain," or that her testimony would be "inherently unreliable," 
are supported by the record. The court's findings where based on 
the report of Dr. Kevin Gulley. (R. At 1532-31). Defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's findings is based on statements in 
Dr. Gully's report. (R. at 1366-67). 
The State argues that the statements made by Dr. Gully in 
his report, and during his testimony in court support the 
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findings of the trial court. (Brief of Appellee at 43-44). The 
testimony the State relies on are statements that "there may be 
some degradation in [C.W.'s] capacity to recall information if 
the presence of [the defendants] means that she will be exposed 
to the more complex environment of the general courtroom, because 
they may distract her and create more anxiety." (R. At 1367) . 
Dr. Gully indicated C.W. would answer questions in defendant's 
presence, but that she might not respond fully if she believes it 
will stop her from seeing her mother, or if she feels 
embarrassed. (R. At 1367) . C.W. told the Doctor she would not be 
able to testify if her mother or defendant were present. (R. 
13 61). Dr. Gully indicated C.W. would be more responsive if she 
testified outside defendant's presence. (R. at 1612). 
Contrasting Dr. Gully's testimony and report with the 
requirements of Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
demonstrates that the trial court's findings are not adequately 
supported and that therefore, the requirements of Maryland v. 
Craig 497 U.S. 837, 840, 110 S.Ct. 3157, 3160 (1990) have not 
been satisfied. There is not sufficient evidence in the report 
or the testimony to support the trial court's findings. Dr. 
Gully describes the any emotional distress which C.W. would 
experience as something that would be very short term. (R. 1612 
at 87). Dr. Gully also failed to indicate that C.W.'s testimony 
would be "inherently unreliable." As to C.W., Dr. Gully's report 
does not support a finding of "serious emotional or mental 
strain." Dr. Gully testified that C.W. could testify without 
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"serious emotional trauma." (R. at 1368-67). What the State 
seems to be advocating is that any anxiety, or any degradation 
in testimony is sufficient to justify eliminating defendant's 
confrontation rights. 
Allowing C.W. to testify by closed circuit was 
prejudicial to defendant's case because she was the only witness 
who testified that he had acted physically toward any of Bobbie 
Dawn's children. 
VI. DEFENDANT'S MOTIONS FOR CHANGE OF VENUE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
GRANTED. 
In his previous memorandum, defendant argued that the trial 
court abused its discretion by not granting one of several 
motions to change venue. (Brief of appellant at 31-35). The 
basis for the motions was extensive pretrial publicity, and the 
fact that physicians who were to be witnesses in the trial had 
treated B.L. and were likely to have treated several of the 
jurors. 
The State argues that defendant conceded the impartiality of 
the jury by passing the jury for cause. (Brief of appellee at 
46). The State's argument is apparently based on State v. 
Pearson 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997) . In Pearson, the defendant 
passed the jury panel for cause, and the motion for change of 
venue was never renewed based on excessive publicity. (Pearson 
at 1350) . 
The facts in the case at bar are significantly different. 
The motion to change venue was made and denied prior to trial, 
16 
but the trial court offered to reconsider its decision if an 
impartial jury could not be impaneled. (R. 1604 at 16-17, R. 497, 
R. 1608 at 67-69, R. 1607 at 6-8). The defense renewed the 
motion after the first 15 jurors had been questioned on voir 
dire. The basis of the motion was that 12 of the 15 had read or 
heard about the case, and 11 of the 15 had been treated by 
doctors who would be witnesses. (R. 1605 at 38-39). Defendant 
Bobbie Widdison made the motion two more times during voir dire. 
(R. 1605 at 157-158, R. 1604 at 16-17). The court again denied 
the motions. (R. 1604 at 17) . In Pearson the motion to change 
venue was made prior to trial, was denied and never renewed after 
or during voir dire. (Pearson at 1349). 
In the case at bar, the motion to change venue was made 
prior to trial, and was renewed continually during jury selection 
as set forth above. There was no reason to challenge the panel 
for cause, because the previous motions had been made and denied. 
(R.1604, 16-17, R. 497, R.1608 at 67-69, 1607 at 6-8, R. 1605 at 
157-158) . Further objections would not have made it any more 
clear to the trial court that defendants believed the jury panel 
was not impartial because of the extensive pretrial publicity, 
and the personal relationships between potential jurors and 
witnesses. 
The exposure of jurors to media and other pretrial reports 
of facts of the case can be demonstrated by examining the record. 
(R. at 1604, page and line: 13-14, 15-15, 21-23, 36-24, 37-2, 45-
24, 46-12, 48-23, 85-17, 104-5, 104-7, 105-18, 105-20, 110-7, 
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139-25, 140-20, 158-3, 163-15, 171-24, 178-8, 85-17, 88-21, 140-
24, 20-6, 20-9, 21-17, 42-3, 42-4, 48-18, 171-21, 178-8, 205-8, 
20-7, 66-23, 88-22, 149-24, 171-25, 13-22, 16-19, 77-6). 
R. 1605 page and line: 44-5, 44-22, 45-24, 45-25, 46-3, 48-20, 
65-6, 65-14, 65-15, 66-12, 67-20, 67-23, 88-24, 91-8, 115-17, 
117-16, 128-3, 177-17, 123-3, 128-6, 139-14, 139-17, 193-20, 11-
12, 111-6, 116-1, 116-2, 149-6, 199-9, 199-10, 74-17, 160-5, 160-
13, 164-25, 170-20, 205-1, 217-5, 217-6, 217-7, 218-8, 160-14, 
215-1, 157-7, 157-8, 157-15, 157-20, 160-21, 163-2, 163-11, 163-
13, 163-16, 164-6, 164-7, 164-11, 165-3, 167-22, 206-18, 206-21, 
206-23, 213-4, 213-9.) 
Where nearly every potential juror had prior knowledge of 
facts of the case, and many of the potential jurors had personal 
Dr. patient relationships with witnesses in the case, it was 
clearly an abuse of discretion not to grant the motions for 
change of venue. 
VII. THE PRIOR TAPED INTERVIEWS OF J.W. AND C.W. SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED. 
Exhibit 87 is a transcript of a taped interview with J.W. 
and C.W. which took place at a foster home shortly after B.L.'s 
death. (R. 1600 at 143). It was the intention of the defense to 
allow the jury to listen to the tape of the interview. The 
transcript was made part of the record for review purposes. (R. 
1600 at 152). After objection and proffer, the trial court held 
the evidence inadmissible. (R. 1600 at 144-151). 
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The State argues that the evidence should be excluded based 
on the ruling by the trial court. (Brief of Appellee at 50) . It 
is defendant's position that the jury should have been allowed to 
listen to the tape, or read the transcript, and that failure to 
admit the evidence was prejudicial to defendant. 
The statements should have been admitted based on 
inconsistency with J.W. and C.W.'s testimony, on the basis that 
improper techniques were used in interviewing the children, and 
that the statements were necessary to impeach the children's 
testimony. (R. 1600 at 148-149) . 
The trial court excluded the evidence on the basis that it 
was hearsay and inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 802. A prior 
statement of a witness is not hearsay where the statement is 
"inconsistent with the declarant's testimony. . ." (Rule 801 
Utah Rules of Evidence). At trial, C.W. testified that Travis 
hit her in the nose, and struck her with a belt, (R. 1631 p. 47, 
50, 62), and that he and the co-defendant spanked B.L. (R. 1631 
at 40, 41, 44). This testimony is inconsistent with C.W.'s 
statements in exhibit 87 that Travis did not spank B.L. (R. 1600 
at 146), that he didn't do anything to B.L., (R. 1600 at 146), 
and that Travis is nice to C.W. (R. 1600 at 146). These are 
inconsistent statements which should have been admitted. 
VIII. DEFENDANT'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE ADEQUATELY SET FORTH IN 
THE PREVIOUS BRIEF. 
In his previous brief defendant discussed issues regarding 
the admissibility of statements to his ex-wife, (brief of 
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Appellant at 39) , denial of defendants motion to dismiss or for a 
directed verdict, (brief of appellant at 41), refusal of the 
trial judge to give a particular jury instruction, (brief of 
appellant at 44) denial of motions for mistrial, (brief of 
appellant at 46) , and the effect of cumulative error (brief of 
appellant at 48). Upon review of defendant's previous brief, and 
the brief filed by the State in this matter, it appears that 
additional briefing by appellant would not be helpful to the 
court in reviewing this matter. Defendant will therefore submit 
the matter based on the previous brief. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Based on the preceding argument, and on the argument set for 
in appellant's brief, if the court finds that the evidence was 
insufficient to convict defendant, or that the State failed offer 
sufficient evidence to survive defendant's motion to dismiss or 
for a directed verdict, defendant respectfully requests that his 
conviction be reversed. If the court finds harmful error 
pursuant to any of the other arguments set forth in defendant' s 
briefs, defendant requests a new trial. 
DATED this P/^ day of December, 1999. 
SCRIBNER, STIRLAND, & MCCANDLESS, P.C. 
BY: ^ <*Y*JAJ/ (Lt 
DONALD E. McCJ^ 
THOMAS J. SCRIBI^R 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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APPENDIX I 
Rules 
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence." 
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to 
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the 
determination of the action more probable or less probable 
than it would be without the evidence. 
Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; ir-
relevant evidence inadmissible. 
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States or the 
Constitution of the state of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or 
by other rules applicable in courts of this state. Evidence 
which is not relevant is not admissible. 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's 
character or a trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a par-
ticular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut 
the same: 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by 
the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character 
trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in 
a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor: 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a 
witness, as provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, 
evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant 
for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of 
Rules 402 and 403. 
Rule 801. Definitions. 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(a) Statement. A "statement*" is d) an oral or written asser-
tion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by 
the person as an assertion. 
(b) Declarant. A ^declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay"* is a statement, other than one made 
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if: 
(1) Prior statement by icitness. The declarant testifies at the 
trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning 
the statement and the statement is t A> inconsistent with the 
declarant's testimony or the witness denies having made the 
statement or has forgotten, or < B» consistent with the declar-
ant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied 
charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper 
influence or motive, or -O one of identification of a person 
made after perceiving the person: or 
(2) Admission by parzy-opponent. The statement is offered 
against a party and is < A- the party's own statement, in either 
an individual or a representative capacity, or (B) a statement 
of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its 
truth, or (C) a statement by a person authorized by the party 
to make a statement concerning the subject, or (D) a state-
ment by the party's agent or sen-ant concerning a matter 
within the scope of the agency or employment, made during 
the existence of the relationship, or (E» a statement by a 
coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance 
of the conspiracy. 
Rule 802. Hearsay rule. 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by 
these rules. 
APPENDIX II 
Statutes 
62A-4a-411. Failure to report — Criminal penalty. 
Any person, official, or institution required to report a case 
of suspected child abuse, child sexual abuse, neglect, fetal 
alcohol syndrome, or fetal drug dependency, who willfully fails 
to do so is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Action for failure to 
report must be commenced within four years from the date of 
knowledge of the offense and the willful failure to report. 
1994 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence —- -'Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words ""element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circums:ances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense: 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1973 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child"' means a human being who is 17 years of age 
or less. 
(b) "Child abuse"" means any offense described in Sub-
section (2) or (3), or in Section 76-5-109.1. 
(c) "Physical injury" means an injury to or condition of 
a child which impairs the physical condition of the child, 
including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion: 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition: or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's 
health or welfare and which is not a serious physical 
injury as defined in Subsection < l)(d>. 
(d) "Serious physical injury" means any physical injury 
or set of injuries which seriously impairs the child's 
health, or which involves physical torture or causes seri-
ous emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of 
the brain, whether caused by blows, shaking, or 
causing the child's head to impact with an object or 
surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot 
water, or those caused by placing a hot object upon 
the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injur/ caused by use of a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601: 
(v) any combination of two or more physical inju-
ries inflicted by the same person, either at the same 
time or on different occasions: 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in 
severe emotional harm, severe developmental delay 
or retardation, or severe impairment of the child's 
abilitv to function; 
(viii) any injur/ which creates a permanent disfig-
urement or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of a bodily member, limb, or organ; 
(ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease 
breathing, even if resuscitation is successful follow-
ing the conduct: or 
(x) any conduct which results in starvation or 
failure to thrive or malnutrition that jeopardizes the 
child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical 
injury or, having the care or custody of such child, causes or 
permits another to inflict serious physical injury upon a child 
is guilty of an offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
felony of the second degree: 
(b) if done recklessly the offense is a felony of the third 
degree; or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, 
having the care or custody of such child, causes or permits 
another to inflict physical injury upon a child is guilty of an 
offense as follows: 
(a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a 
class A misdemeanor 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misde-
meanor: or 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a 
class C misdemeanor. 
(4) A parent or legal guardian who provides a child with 
t rea tment by spiritual means alone through prayer, in lieu of 
medical treatment, in accordance with the tenets and prac-
tices of an established church or religious denomination of 
which the parent or legal guardian is a member or adherent 
shall not, for that reason alone, be deemed to have committed 
an offense under this section. 1999 
76-8-306. Obstructing justice. 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, 
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a 
crime, he: 
(aj knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it 
from a magistrate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender, 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, 
disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or appre-
hension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or ap-
prehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence 
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or convic-
tion of the person; 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception any-
one from performing an act that might aid in the discov-
ery apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the per-
son; or 
(g) having knowledge that a law enforcement oScer 
has beeA authorized or has applied for authorization 
under either Section 77-23a-10 or 77-23a-15 to intercept a 
wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives notice or 
attempts to give notice of the possible interception tc any 
person. 
(2)~ An offense under Subsections (U(a) through (f) is a class 
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that the offender 
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree, in 
\yhich case the offense is a ^second degree felony-
(3) An offense under Subsection (l)<g) is a third degree 
felony. 
(4)' Subsection (l)(f) does not apply to an act against a juror. 
Obstructing the function of a juror is addressed in Section 
76-8-508.57 
(5) The provisions of Section 76-8-316 shall govern an act or 
threat against a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons 
and Parole or the judge's or member's immediate family. 1995 
76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict li-
ability. 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a 
culpable mental state, and when the definition of the offense 
does not specify a culpable mental state and the offense does 
not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense 
shall involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense 
clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
responsibility for commission of the conduct prohibited by the 
statute without requiring proof of any culpable mental state. 
1983 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent 
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously'; and "criminal 
negligence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with re-
spect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his 
conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct 
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the 
existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he 
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause 
the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circum-
stances surrounding his conduct or "the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise under all the circumstances as 
viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it consti-
tutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances 
as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 1974 
78-3a-103. Definitions-
CD As used in this chapter: 
(a) "Abused child" includes a minor less than 18 years 
of age who: 
(i) has suffered or been threatened with 
nonaccidental physical or mental harm, negligent 
treatment, or sexual exploitation; or 
(ii) has been the victim of any sexual abuse. 
(b) "Adjudication" means a finding by the court, incor-
porated in a decree, that the facts alleged in the petition 
have been proved. 
(c) "Adult" means a person 18 years of age or over, 
except that persons 18 years or over under the continuing 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 
78-3a-121 shall be referred to as minors. 
(d) "Board" means the Board of Juvenile Court Judges. 
(e) "Child placement agency" means: 
(i) a private agency licensed to receive minors for 
placement or adoption under this code; or 
(ii) a private agency receiving minors for place-
ment or adoption in another state, which agency is 
licensed or approved where such license or approval 
is required by law. 
(f) "Commit" means to transfer legal custody. 
(g) "Court" means the juvenile court. 
(h) "Dependent child" includes a minor who is homeless 
or without proper care through no fault of his parent, 
guardian, or custodian. 
(i) "Deprivation of custody" means transfer of legal 
custody by the court from a parent or the parents or a 
previous legal custodian to another person, agency, or 
institution. 
(j) "Detention" means home detention and secure de-
tention as defined in Section 62A-7-101 for the temporary 
care of minors who require secure custody in physically 
restricting facilities: 
(i) pending court disposition or transfer to another 
jurisdiction; or 
(ii) while under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
court. 
(k) "Formal referral" means a written report from a 
peace officer or other person informing the court that a 
minor is or appears to be within the court's jurisdiction 
and that a petition may be filed. 
(1) "Group rehabilitation therapy" means psychological 
and social counseling of one or more persons in the group, 
depending upon the recommendation of the therapist. 
(m) "Guardianship of the person" includes the author-
ity to consent to marriage, to enlistment in the armed 
forces, to major medical, surgical, or psychiatric treat-
ment, and to legal custody, if legal custody is not vested in 
another person, agency, or institution. 
(n) "Habitual truant" is a school-age minor who has 
received more than two truancy citations within one 
school year from the school in which the minor is or 
should be enrolled and eight absences without a legiti-
mate or valid excuse or who, in defiance of efforts on the 
part of school authorities as required under Section 53A-
11-103, refuses to regularly attend school or any sched-
uled period of the school day. 
(o) "Legal custody" means a relationship embodying 
the following rights and duties: 
(i) the right to physical custody of the minor; 
(ii) the right and duty to protect, train, and disci-
pline the minor; 
(iii) the duty to provide the minor with food, cloth-
ing, shelter, education, and ordinary medical care; 
(iv) the right to determine where and with whom 
the minor shall live; and 
(v) the right, in an emergency, to authorize surgery 
or other extraordinary care, 
(p) "Minor" means a person under the age of 18 years. 
It includes the term "child" as used in other parts of this 
chapter. 
(q) "Natural parent" means a minors biological or 
adoptive parent, and includes the minor's noncustodial 
parent. 
(r) (i) "Neglected child" means a minor: 
(A) whose parent, guardian, or custodian has 
abandoned or subjected the minor to mistreat-
ment or abuse; 
(B) who lacks proper parental care by reason 
of the fault or habits of the parent, guardian, or 
custodian; 
(C) whose parent, guardian, or custodian fails 
or refuses to provide proper or necessary subsis-
tence, education, or medical care, including sur-
gery or psychiatric services when required, or 
any other care necessary for health, safety, mor-
als, or well-being; or 
(D) who is at risk of being a neglected or 
abused child as defined in this chapter because 
another minor in the same home is a neglected or 
abused child as defined in this chapter, 
(ii) The aspect of neglect related to education, 
described in Subsection (l)(r)(i)(C), means that, after 
receiving notice that a minor has been frequently-
absent from school without good cause, or that the 
minor has failed to cooperate with school authorities 
in a reasonable manner, a parent or guardian fails to 
make a good faith effort to ensure that the minor 
receives an appropriate education. 
(iii) A parent or guardian legitimately practicing 
religious beliefs and who, for that reason, does not 
provide specified medical treatment for a minor, is 
not guilty of neglect, 
(s) "Nonjudicial adjustment" means closure of the case 
by the assigned probation officer without judicial deter-
mination upon the consent in writing of the minor, the 
parent, legal guardian or custodian, and the assigned 
probation officer. 
(t) "Probation" means a legal status created by court 
order following an adjudication on the ground of a viola-
tion of law or under Section 78-3a-104, whereby the minor 
is permitted to remain in his home under prescribed 
conditions and under supervision by the probation depart-
ment or other agency designated by the court, subject to 
return to the court for violation of any of the conditions 
prescribed. 
(u) "Protective supervision" means a legal status cre-
ated by court order following an adjudication on the 
ground of abuse, neglect, or dependency, whereby the 
minor is permitted to remain in his home, and supervision 
and assistance to correct the abuse, neglect, or depen-
dency is provided by the probation department or other 
agency designated by the court. 
(v) "Residual parental rights and duties" means those 
rights and duties remaining with the parent after legal 
custody or guardianship, or both, have been vested in 
another person or agency, including the responsibility for 
support, the right to consent to adoption, the right to 
determine the child's religious affiliation, and the right to 
reasonable visitation unless restricted by the court. If no 
guardian has been appointed, "residual parental rights 
and duties" also include the right to consent to marriage, 
to enlistment, and to major medical, surgical, or psychi-
atric treatment. 
(w) "Secure facility" means any facility operated by or 
under contract with the Division of Youth Corrections, 
that provides 24-hour supervision and confinement for 
youth offenders committed to the division for custody and 
rehabilitation. 
(x) "Shelter" means the temporary care of minors in 
physically unrestricted facilities pending court disposi-
tion or transfer to another jurisdiction. 
(y) "State supervision" means a disposition which pro-
vides a more intensive level of intervention than standard 
probation but is less intensive or restrictive than a com-
munity placement with the Division of Youth Corrections. 
(z) "Termination of parental rights" means the perma-
nent elimination of all parental rights and duties, includ-
ing residual parental rights and duties, by court order. 
(aa) "Therapist" means a person employed by a state 
division or agency for the purpose of conducting psycho-
logical treatment and counseling of a minor in its custody, 
or any other person licensed or approved by the state for 
the purpose of conducting psychological treatment and 
counseling. 
(2) As used in Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
Proceedings, with regard to the Division of Child and Family 
Services: 
(a) "Custody" means the custody of a minor in the 
Division of Child and Family Services as of the date of 
disposition. 
(b) "Protective custody" means the shelter of a minor by 
the Division of Child and Family Services from the time 
the minor is removed from home until the shelter hearing, 
or the minor's return home, whichever occurs earlier. 
(c) "Temporary custody" means the custody of a minor 
in the Division of Child and Family Services from the date 
of the shelter hearing until disposition. 1999 
